The Lonely Truth about Air France Flight 447

We don't know what happened to Air France Flight 447, which disappeared in areas of intense thunderstorms a day ago while en route at 35,000 feet over the Atlantic on a flight from Brazil to France. And we might never know. It will all come down to finding the flight data recorder, the so-called Black Box, which records hundreds of flight parameters and which could, doubtless, shed much light on the event or events that presumably brought the big airliner down.

But in the aftermath of the tragedy--and to his credit French President Nicolas Sarcozy is not offering false hope to the families of the victims--there is sure to be a realization among politicians and the public at large of a hard truth: Airliners carrying hundreds of people across oceanic tracks in the Atlantic and Pacific are essentially on their own for much of their flights. 

The way we track airplanes in North American airspace (and throughout most of the world) is by radar, an approach that works nicely on land but is impossible to implement for oceanic flights. Instead, control is achieved by requiring a great deal of separation between airplanes (to increase safety margins) and relying on position reporting (some automated some done through high frequency radio) to 
make an educated guess about where the airplanes are. Computer models are even used to fine tune these guesses. 

Consequently, searchers looking for clues to the fate of Flight 447 were left without a starting point. Instead they pieced together what few clues they have to narrow their search to an area small enough to be promising, and they found the first wreckage within a day. Finding the flight data recorder will not be easy, but it will likely get done. Modern recorders can survive at depths of up to 20,000 feet or greater, sending out its electronic "ping" for weeks before its battery wears out.

Why do we still use such an antiquated method of air traffic "control" over the oceanic tracks that allows airplanes to be on their own for long periods of time? Because, frankly, it works. Airplanes, more than a thousand flights a day, routinely make their way across the seas. And they have been doing this safely for decades.

But the tragedy of Air France 447 underscores an essential fact of travel, that the earth is a big planet, and the oceans comprise two-thirds of it. They are remote and lonely places.

And had we been in instantaneous communications with Flight 447, perhaps through a multi-billion-dollar satellite communications system for tracking oceanic flights, what difference would it have made? We might immediately have  known the nature of what had happened to the ill-fated Airbus 330-200, but we would have been powerless to provide timely help.

The real hope here is not to create a new oceanic air traffic control system, though there will doubtless be calls to do just that. Instead we should hope to discover just what happened to the Airbus on that stormy night, and if something in the huge web of safety that keeps us safe in the air needs to be fixed, direct our attentions there.

By Robert Goyer

Comments

[Fabio Jacintho]

Everybody is trying to find complicated causes for this horrendous accident, but those who fly like us know exactly what happend: the Aibus broke up inside a specially strong storm. Unfortunately, storms can do that, even though human engineering tries to build aircraft to withsand the highly unpredictable loads encoutered therein, but what we pilots know is we should never penetrate one of these monsters. Why the highly experienced Air France pilot did it, we´ll never know if the black box isn´t found. But the truth is airborne weather radar still suffers from known deficiencies, which could have led the pilot to misdge what he was about to wrestle. If there were a world commitment to establish world-wide service for satellite datalink weather reporting to aircraft, maybe Air France 447´s crew would have had a better chance to appraise the situation and maneuver for a better outcome.

[Waheed Samy]

As a Single Engine Land student pilot, I have come to know that storm turbulence will kill you. I've been wondering what happened and what the pilots in the flight deck felt when they saw it coming. Had they lost their radar and were blind? Had that happened before or after the plane had become crippled? How frightening it must have been for them when they realized it was over.

[robert bondy]

You are absolutely right in saying that, over the oceans or poles or indeed other remote locations on Earth, there is nothing that we on the ground can really do to help those at 35,000 feet. That is why we build these machines to such exacting specifications and rigorously train our flight crews. However, to say that it would take a multi-billion dollar satellite system to pinpoint and track these aircraft is clearly wrong. These multi million dollar aircraft already send constant telemetry back to their home base. In that telemetry could be included GPS co-ordinates derived from even the cheapest GPS receiver. My condolences go out to all those families and loved ones grieving today.

[Philip Beaven]

This may sound cynical but, just perhaps, the AF 447 tragedy will open the eyes of the regulators that the compulsory fitting of ELTs to GA aircraft is a waste of money. Neither Steve Fossett nor the AF 447 passengers benefited in any way.

What would make sense is a telemetry burst on a satphone frequency every 10 (or so) minutes giving the Lat/Long coordinates and height together with an identifier for the aircraft.

A bit like a long-distance a Mode S transponder

[Jorge Paulhiac]

Modern air transportation has become so massive and routinely, that flights are dispatched in almost any weather conditions as long as they comply with minimums by regulations. But perhaps a flight that will have to pass a squall line (along front lines, containing extreme precipitation, hail, frequent lightning, dangerous straight line winds, funnel clouds, tornadoes and waterspouts) with little or no chances of deviations, should not be dispatched until forecasts are better.

[Bob Johnson]

I take exception to the statements that the pilots flew into a huge thunderstorm. One commentator here states "Why the highly experienced Air France pilot did it, we´ll never know if the black box isn´t found". Talk about a rush to judgement! Airline pilots do NOT fly into storms, especially "strong" storms. The digital airborne radars installed in these aircraft have never been better. They provide all the information a pilot needs about a storm to avoid it including warnings for the possibility that the radar is experiancing "attenuation", a condition where the radar itself could become deficient due to a large storms radar return. Think very heavy rain.
Four days prior to this ill fated flight it was reported that there was a "bomb" threat against the same flight and, after a 90 minute search, the airplane was cleared to go. The bomb theory is still a very real possibilty. Reportedly the Captain had over 11000 hours with over 1200 hours in this type of aircraft. The airplanes themselves are very strong. Lets give the investigation time to find some evidence. After 30 years of Airline flying in all kinds of weather and over 20000 hours of experiance I think remarks like the one referenced above do not serve aviation or its passengers well. To indicte these pilots when the investigation has barely begun is, at a minimum, unfair and misguided, IMO.

[Kevin Buckley]

While passing thru this area in a G-5, we had climbed to 47,000 to top the storm. Suddenly the outside air temperature increased 15 degrees and the stick shaker went off. We disconnected the autopilot and flew attitude and sank about 3000 feet. Luckily it was day vfr conditions. I can not imagine the horror of losing control at night. Our prayers go with them.

[Sam Dawson]

We DON'T know exactly what happened. The speculation is that weather caused the accident, but in airplance accident investigations often the initial speculation turns out to be wrong. I have seen at least one accident investigation before where the initial thought was a thunderstorm, but later it turn out to be something completely different. There have been some problems with the flight control computers on the A330 in the past... it may have been that. Then again, maybe it was something we never thought about.

[airgonzo]

"but those who fly like us know exactly what happend: the Aibus broke up inside a specially strong storm. "

You sir are quite simply ill informed to make such a conclusion. This sort of certain statement of "fact" is better suited for picking numbers on a roulette wheel

[G. Mason]

We can speculate and make assumptions all we want but we will not really know until the investigation is complete and then that is often just a "best guess" based on a lot more information than has been reported in the press. If it is weather related, mechanical failure, pilot error or some combination of these, we will have to wait until more is known. I just hope it is not something more sinister.

[Paul]

The storm where the crash occured was the size of Texas. The satelite picture from that morning shows crisp CBs over a vast area. The last verbal message from the pilot was that he was entering an area of CBs. While we cannot conclude that the CBs were for sure the cause of the crash, it is clear to pilots that an aircraft entering an area of CBs like seen in the images would be sufficient to explain the events of the day, including the slow motion failure of all aircraft systems. Here is a detailed analysis of the weather on that day: http://www.weathergraphics.com/tim/af447/

[Andy Mackenzie]

WE have to know what brought this plane down. If the plane broke apart because of turbulence then other planes can break apart. That would be a design problem and as a person who travels a lot. I will try to avoid these planes or older planes that there air frame is weakened by to much flexing in flight. Andy Mackenzie

[EA]

http://www.weathergraphics.com/tim/af447/
This is a great site that takes a look at the wx conditions along the route of flight

[tj]

I checked the weather the day after this accident - huge build up of cb's up to fl 50 smack dab in the middle of the flight path!

[Patrick Barthe]

I have 12000 hours of flight as a crew with AF .The only things we know is first: that the plane take of from Rio and never arrived in Paris second: one is the automatic alert-message about electrical problems send to AF maintenace system for the time being everything else is pure speculations .My first flight as a crew in 1972 was from Paris to Buens Aires right thru the "Pot au noir " where AF447 disapeared and I have seen storm (cumulo-nimbus)climbing at 17000meters !!! we where with a 707 at 10000meters (about) with a lot of crews we have a terrible afternoon in Notre Dame church for those souls and as you all say we must found the "black box " to understand what happen and learn from this accident

[Adrian Piñero]

I dont understand several things, one of them it is where were the rest of the planes, I mean, only this night fron Argentina, there were flights Aerolineas Argentinas, Lufthansa, Air france, Alitalia, Iberia,, all of them crossing the same route, from Brasil, KLM, British, Lufthansa, Airfrance, TAM, TAP, Iberia, Alitalia, and more same time same route, nobody report severe turbulence, we are talking about 10 or 20 planes with 20 or 60 minuts of difference among them, and why the pilot tryed to cross the storm instead of flight paralel to storm line till find a breach, ¿what did the others planes?. May be if the AF 447 got a explosive decompretion, the pilot musto to dive into the big cell, so he found a extreme convective activity, and the plane crash on the sea with out control.

[JohnSivori]

In October of 1963 my family immigrated to the United States from Argentina. I marvel now that with the technology they had back then in what I believe was a British Convair crossing the Atlantic was quite an adventure. Air transport is quite a fantastic and safe way to travel. Still the constant search for aviation safety must continue. I would like to see weather information downloaded to the cockpits of all aircraft giving pilots a clearer idea than radar can.

[Ross Bond]

Personally I wonder about the fly-by-wire nature of the Airbus - I have met airline pilots who have various horror tales about the nature of Airbus' computer systems that seem designed to override the pilot. If the system and all of it's fail-safes go AWOL then the pilot cannot take control in real terms, so If a particularly big lightening strike managed to derange or kill the electronics completely the pilots would have been helpless.

This is a terrifying possibility that has to be considered, no matter how bad for business it would be for Airbus. At least in a Boeing the pilot has the final say when it all turns to crap. I flew with a 767 captain a few months back who has since retired rather than retrain for an A330 based on the arguments above and he does not appear to be alone in his stance.

[Frank]

It's to early to say what happen. I'll wait till I see all the facts.

[Steve S]

On board weather radar needs to se HEAVY precip to paint the RED returns we all know to avoid. The tops of thunderstorms (even beyond the cloud formation) contains severe turbulance, but not that heavy precip. NASA records show thunderstorms in that area produce little, if any lightening. There is also no nexrad sattelite weather info that far out. The experienced crew could have flown blindly into some extremely severe weather. Let's not rule out terrorism until we know differant. Our hearts go out to the family and friens of all that were lost.

[David Lanatti]

Maybe new aircraft should be fitted with two sets of flight data recorders. One set would be fixed, and the other would automatically jetison when the aircraft is out of control. That way at least one set would likely be located sooner.

[Fabio Jacintho]

Some commentators were mad at me because I went straight to the conclusion in plain language, without a lot of "if"s and based this conclusion on very few hard facts, and they are, of course, right. I apologise if I hurt anybody´s feelings with this approach, but I was trying to be realistic in face of the facts at hand, which unfortunately are proving to converge to the exact same conclusion, as more is known about this tragedy. A perfectly normal functioning airplane says g´night to the last Control Center, and before calling up the next, enters a complex storm system, emits an automated signal of auto-pilot turn-off - probably extreme turbulence - and in the next four minutes issues signals for nav system disrupture, primary and secondary computers disabled and finally depressurization and extreme vertical speed alterations, I´ll probably deduce the storm did it all. If only the major factor, but if it wasn´t for it AF 447 would certainly have landed safely few hours laters. As did Iberia 6024, only 10 minutes behind, which dodged the storm system to the east. Sorry to all if my conclusions were a little too fast, but I was only expressing an opinion that reflects my 15 year flying experience - keep away from these systems!

[Brian Goodman]

While it may seem likely that a large thunderstorm is to blame for the AF 447 crash, assumptions are not good enough. The possiblity of terrorism must be considered. I am fairly sure that an explosion on board an enroute airliner could trigger all of the automated messages sent that night. And don't forget that there was another aircrew in the area that saw a bright light descending downward to the sea.

As far as satellite weather datalink while over oceans, remember that there is no NEXRAD out in the ocean, so the only info that could be received is satellite pics, not likely to be more beneficial than on board radar.

[Ing. Rodolfo Astrada]

Unholy marriage of airline and passenger scheduling on one hand, and the capricious nature of weather.
Most certainly a seasoned crew like this had encountered convective activity before, had come routinely through it. Now, how do you justify as crewmember before upper management a costly diversion for the sake of safety in the face of quite normal storms brewing in the intertropical convergence zone?

Perhaps this tragedy could lead to better regulations which may relive crews from tough decisions up and alone, and not being accountable to the extra costs and damage to the airline marketing department.

[Jim W.]

Being an A&P and having worked extensively on this aircraft type and its attending safety systems, I can say with confidence that it would take an unprecedented event to cause complete electrical failure, failure of the flight control systems, and particularly failure of the pressurization system. Without drawing conclusions from insufficient data, this tragic event has all the earmarks of an unknown catastrophic event taking place while at cruise altitude. Whether it be controlled flight into severe weather or some other event, we won't know until the DFDR (Digital Flight Data Recorder) is recovered and analyzed.
This aircraft is designed with systems that don't just have one backup. There are multiple backups for emergency operations. In the case of electrical failure, there are two batteries on board that automatically take over essential functions for a minimum of thirty minutes of operation for primary flight control computers, navigation, air data, flight instruments, and communications. If the engines are operating, the hydraulic systems are powered....and the electronic engine controls are self-powered by a PMA (permanent magnet alternator). Also, if the engines are operating, there is air for pressurization, the automatic systems can compensate for some VERY large leaks, and the warning systems give the flight crew plenty of notice before cabin pressure is reduced to a consciousness-threatening level....AND the oxygen masks will deploy in a depressurization event.
I'm quite sure that Air France has both its engineers and the analysts in Toulouse going over ever scrap of telemetry that they received from the aircraft to try and figure out what happened, but nobody will know anything for sure until the DFDR is located and has given up its information.
One more thing....while the weather radar on the aircraft is quite sophisticated, it does have a very difficult time identifying and locating clear-air disturbances.

Jim W.
Aviation Maintenance Technician